Abstract-Cognitive Radio (CR), which is the next generation wireless communication system, enables unlicensed users or Secondary Users (SUs) to exploit underutilized spectrum (called white spaces) owned by the licensed users or Primary Users (PUs) so that bandwidth availability improves at the SUs, which helps to improve the overall spectrum utilization. Collaboration, which has been adopted in various schemes such distributed channel sensing and channel access, is an intrinsic characteristic of CR to improve network performance. However, the requirement to collaborate has inevitably open doors to various forms of attacks by malicious SUs, and this can be addressed using Trust and Reputation Management (TRM). Generally speaking, TRM detects malicious SUs including honest SUs that turn malicious. To achieve a more efficient detection, we advocate the use of Reinforcement Learning (RL), which is known to be flexible and adaptable to the changes in operating environment in order to achieve optimal network performance. Its ability to learn and re-learn throughout the duration of its existence provides intelligence to the proposed TRM model, and so the focus on RL-based TRM model in this paper. Our preliminary results show that the detection performance of RLbased TRM model has an improvement of 15% over the traditional TRM in a centralized cognitive radio network. The investigation in the paper serves as an important foundation for future work in this research field.
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of wireless communication, the demand for radio spectrum has placed great challenges on the traditional spectrum allocation policy, in which the licensed spectrum is mostly underutilized. Cognitive Radio (CR) [1] enables unlicensed users or Secondary Users (SUs) to sense for and opportunistically utilize white spaces without interfering with the licensed users or Primary Users' (PUs') activities. PUs' activities may or may not exist in underutilized channels at a particular time instance. In the absence of PUs' activities, a block of radio resource (e.g. a transmission opportunity) in an underutilized channel is regarded as a white space. Hence, CR promotes flexibility of channel access through reconfiguration of transmission parameters, particularly the operating channels.
An intrinsic characteristic of CR is collaboration, in which SUs collaborate with each other (e.g. message exchange) to improve network-wide performance. For instance, collaborative channel sensing enables SUs to collaborate with each other through exchanges of channel sensing outcomes in order to improve accuracy of the detection of white spaces. The inaccuracy of channel sensing outcomes is caused by multipath and shadowing, and so a very robust and accurate sensing capability on each SU is necessary if collaboration is not implemented. Hence collaboration helps to achieve robustness without imposing radical requirements on individual SU [3] . However, collaboration has inevitably laid SUs open to attacks. In Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), each SU may be potentially malicious. A single false sensing outcome from a malicious SU to a SU Base Station (SU BS), which serves as a fusion center or to clusterhead respectively, may cause inaccuracy in the final decision. Consequently, SU network performance will be affected. Moreover, there are many types of SUs competing to use the underutilized channels, including honest, faulty, selfish, and malicious SUs, as well as SUs that launch collusion attacks. The faulty SUs are malfunctioning devices, or they may be located in fading or shadowing zones, and so they send inaccurate sensing outcomes to the fusion center or their respective neighbors. The selfish and malicious SUs are motivated by their specific intentions to monopolize and interfere with either the SUs or the PUs, respectively. The SUs that launch collusion attacks are either malicious or selfish, and they jointly launch attacks to interfere with PUs or break the rules of CR for either selfish gain or malicious intention.
To address the above problem, Trust and Reputation Management (TRM) has been adopted to identify the misbehaving SUs (e.g. faulty, selfish and malicious) among collaborating SUs. Reinforcement Learning (RL) is applied to TRM in order to dynamically tackle honest SUs behavior which may turn malicious (e.g. the SUs may not relay packets for PUs as agreed) as time progresses. In [14] , RL based auction algorithm for dynamic spectrum access has been applied to CRNs. However, to the best of our knowledge, RL-based TRM has not been applied to spectrum paper, we propose a novel RL-based TRM spectrum leasing in CRNs, specifically Q-le which aims to increase the detection efficien SUs. The organization of this article is as fo presents related work of Reinforcement Lea TRM and its application in CRNs. Section proposed RL-based TRM model and sim Section IV provides conclusion, and Section V work.
II. RELATED WORK

A. Reinforcement Learning
RL is an unsupervised artificial intellige enables an agent to observe and learn abo dynamic operating environment in the absen feedback or the expected response from experienced entities, and subsequently mak action selection in order to achieve optimal system performance.
The following sub-sections provide an ove its application to security.
1) Q-learning and its representations
Q-learning [12, 13] , is a single-agent on-l RL. The on-line learning is real-time and co the entire life of an agent where it observes simultaneously. Fig. 1 shows an abstract v centralized setting. RL consists of three namely state, action and reward. The state, w from the operating environment, represents f the way in which an agent makes a decisi represents the performance metrics to be ma higher detection rate. The action represents a an agent in order to maximize its reward. reward, but on the other hand, it m an action that yields better rewards the agent will continuously choos found to provide the highest re experience. To achieve an o performance, a balanced of trade-o exploitation is required. Hence, RL problem that requires an agent to uncertain or changing operating achieve a given goal.
2) Exploration and exploitation
3) Reinforcement Learning for S
The following are some of the TRM in order to enhance security in
• RL enables a node to learn and uncertain operating env honest or collaborating SU m progresses. RL is capable of in such operating environme • RL uses a simple modeling complexity involved in th environment [17] . For insta selects its honest neighbor only need to either observe and behavior or jointly obs exchanges its sensing outco reputation value of its neighb approach enables SU to foc interest, in this case the ma we use state , to represent SU neighbor .
• RL enables a node to tack which the solution is de decisions, with the notion reward [17] . This can be a especially when the mali dynamic. In our paper, represent a gain when SU n the correct destination.
RL schemes have been develop security challenges.
• Dynamicity of the nodes' be from honest to malicious as versa. RL model with suitab been applied to provide a mechanism to monitor the n [18] .
• Dynamicity of attack stra strategies may change dynam to keep track of the way (e For instance, the maliciou change their jamming strat nodes to dynamically and channel access in order to a RL has been applied to intelligent mechanism to lea time progresses [20, 21] .
may also lead to discovering s in the future. To exploit, se an action that has been eward based on its past optimal or near-optimal ff between exploration and L method is suitable for any learn and re-learn from an environment in order to Security Enhancements benefits of applying RL to n CRNs:
n and adapt to its dynamic vironment. For example, an may turn malicious as time f identifying malicious SUs nt [15] . approach that reduces the he modeling of operating ance, in CRN, a SU that s for collaboration would its neighbors' performance serve with other SUs, and ome in order to compute a bors. The simplicity of this us on the actual subject of alicious SUs. In our paper, t the reputation value of the kle its security problem in ependent on a series of of maximizing discounted a more effective approach icious SUs' behavior is we use reward , to neighbor relays packets to ped to tackle the following ehavior. Nodes may change time progresses, and vicebility values for TRM has a dynamic and intelligent nodes' behavior at all times ategies. Malicious nodes' mically and it is a challenge e.g. frequency) they attack. us nodes may continually tegies causing the honest strategically change their void the jammed channels. provide a dynamic and arn attackers' strategies as B. Trust and reputation management in cognitive radio networks TRM for CRNs is a framework to identify malicious SUs and verify data authenticity. The trust of an entity represents its reputation value, which is calculated based on the entity's action or information (e.g. the expected delivery of packets for PUs as agreed) in different time period. Higher reputation value indicates greater trust of the entity among its community. The main objective of TRM is to promote trust amongst the SUs in order to lessen the negative impact of mistrust SUs. Specifically, it detects mistrust SUs or false sensing outcomes, and reduces the effects of mistrust, such as false positive and false negative. TRM aims to ameliorate the effects of attacks on tasks that require collaboration among entities through the detection of malicious SUs or manipulated information.
The TRM schemes in CRNs involve the detection of various kinds of entities (e.g. malicious SUs that generate false sensing outcomes, and those that interfere with PUs), and events (e.g. PUs existence). For instance, TRM schemes in [4] - [10] detects malicious SUs that intentionally or unintentionally generate false sensing outcomes by ignoring their false sensing outcomes, which may be used by a fusion center to make final decisions, while [11] detect malicious SUs that disobey the channel access rules and continue to access the channels in the presence of PUs activities.
C. Application of RL-based TRM model in Cogntive Radio
Networks To facilitate the opportunistic access of white spaces, CRNs offers Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) [22] , which enables SUs to intelligently share local available channels among themselves based on their instantaneous demands. While DSA helps to improve resource utilization without regulating spectrum demand and access behaviors, it may face significant degradation in access reliability [23] . To ameliorate such negative effects, a DSA approach called spectrum leasing has been proposed [24] . This approach allows PUs to temporarily transfer and trade the licensed spectrum usage rights of the white spaces to SUs in exchange for monetary compensation [25] [26] [27] or packets relaying [28, 29] . To the best of our knowledge, the security features in spectrum leasing in CRNs is lacking and further security enhancements would need to be developed in order to provide a better measure of security.
While attacks on CRNs can be perceived in many forms such as unintentional, intentional, single, and collusion attacks, it is worth to note that all these attacks are operating in a dynamic environment. To increase the defense in spectrum leasing, TRM would need to be intelligent enough to learn and re-learn from the dynamic environment in order to be always ahead of the attackers so as to counter their attacks. This paper presents a preliminary investigation on the application of RL-based TRM to spectrum leasing in CRNs in order to enhance its security measures.
III. PROPOSED RL-BASED TRM MODEL FOR SPECTRUM
LEASING
In CRNs, SUs can interact with PUs to negotiate and collaborate on leasing the licensed channels in return for channel access. The objective of the proposed model is to improve PUs transmission rate, throughput, end-to-end delay performances and energy efficiency through selecting the honest SUs to collaborate. In our model, SUs form an alternative route and offer their services as an intermediate relay node in order to enhance PUs. To reciprocate, SUs can 'piggy back' some of its own data while acting as a relay.
We model the environment of spectrum leasing via auction mechanism as follows:
• Step 1: The PU BS determines the cost and duration of the white spaces.
• Step 2: The PU BS broadcasts the cooperation information (e.g. spectral bands, SNR and cost) to SU BS.
•
Step 3: The SU BS broadcasts the cooperation information to its SU hosts.
Step 4: The SU hosts determine optimum transmission and relaying strategies using the cooperation information while the SU hosts determine bid values.
Step 5: The SU hosts send their respective strategies and bids to SU BS.
• Step 6: Depending on the SUs' reputation values, SU BS decides to lease or not the channels to SU
•
Step 7: The SU BS sends its decisions to PU BS.
• Step 8: The PU BS decides to lease or not, and select suitable SUs as relays.
• Step 9: The PU BS transmits packets; and the SU BS divides the spectral band and allocates orthogonal subbands, as well as the access time, to each SU, and the SUs transmit packets.
A general equation to calculate reputation value is as follows:
where is the sensing outcome of SU i and is the final decision given by a fusion center [16] . In our spectrum leasing model, increases when SU i has successfully relay the packets for PU, where is the expected packet relay destination of SU i and is the packet relay destination requested by PU.
In CRNs, choosing honest SUs to collaborate in spectrum leasing may increase the overall network performance. However, due to the possibility of attacks from malicious SUs, selecting the right SUs to collaborate may be a challenge. In addition, there is no guarantee that the chosen SUs will continue to remain honest throughout the duration of spectrum leasing. Hence, it is critical to develop a TRM model that is robust and adaptable to the operating environment in order to increase the detection efficiency of malicious SUs.
Generally speaking, as seen from Fig. 2 , the Q-learning algorithm works by estimating the values of state-action pairs. For each state-action pair, the agent observes its short-term reward (or delayed reward), and learns its long-term reward (or discounted reward) as time progresses. The state-action pairs and their respective discounted rewards are represented by Q-values, which are kept in a two-dimensional Q-table. The delayed reward is received after the agent has taken the action at time ; while the discounted reward max , represents the cumulative rewards received by the agent in future. To re-iterate, the Q-value , update is represented in (2) .
For each random initial state , , initialize Q- 
End for
Fig. 2. Q-Learning Algorithm
The discount factor emphasizes on the importance of future rewards. If 1 , the agent considers the same weightage for both delayed and discounted rewards. If 0, the agent only considers the delayed reward, and in this case, it is called a myopic approach as compared to the most farsighted approach which has 1.
As shown in the Q-learning algorithm, an agent will continue to learn to improve its learning experience until an optimal policy is found. When an agent selects an appropriate action for a state-action pair, the respective Q-value increases, and vice-versa. Hence, in order to maximize cumulative reward over a period of time, the agent learns to take the optimal or near-optimal policy (or a series of actions), which has the optimal Q-value given a particular state as shown in (3) .
The learning rate determines to what extent the newly acquired knowledge overrides the previously learnt Q-value. If 1, the agent considers the most current Q-value. The higher the learning rate value , the greater the current learnt knowledge overrides the old. Higher learning rate speeds up the learning process and this may lead to faster convergence; however, it also causes the agent to respond more drastically to each reward update, which may destabilize the learning process and subsequently, the agent may not converge. On the other hand, a lower learning rate provides a smooth and predictable learning behavior of an agent, and the time taken to converge may be longer
The RL-based TRM model is shown in Table I . State represents the SU neighbor nodes or reputation values. Action represents the selection of a neighbor node which has the highest reputation value for collaboration. Reward of a stateaction pair , represents the cost incurred in collaboration with neighbor node . The following sections discuss the simulation scenario, simulation parameters, and preliminary results. As a preliminary investigation, a myopic approach of RL is used in the simulation.
A. Simulation Scenario
The RL-based TRM model is deployed at the SU BS. We consider a static network in a time-slotted environment, with SU BS located at the center of SU nodes (Fig. 1) . As an initial investigation, we consider SU BS interacts with PU directly. When unutilized channel is available, PU notifies SU BS, which then broadcasts the cooperation information to its SU hosts. Upon receiving the information, SU hosts send their respective bids to SU BS. Using the RL-based TRM model, SU BS filters out the malicious SUs from collaboration. During the collaboration process i.e. relaying packets for PU, there are SUs that turn malicious and perform random attacks. A traditional TRM and RL-based TRM are used to detect malicious SUs. During each round of packets relay, random attack is launched. From the analysis, further inve out to refine the RL algorithm to im high percentage (> 35%) of mali percentage (< 5%) of malicious impact to the overall system perform This paper advocates the use efficient method to detect maliciou RL enable SUs to observe, learn an dynamic operating environment w obey a predefined set of rules. Thi RL provides a competitive edge where the SUs may not be necessar may turn malicious as time progres that it is capable of achieving compared to that of the traditional T an effective approach, the existin further enhanced to incorporate RL performance.
V. FUTURE
The preliminary simulation a effectiveness of the RL-based TRM possible improvements can be carrie
• to introduce more than on environment in order to scenario.
• to incorporate discount fac exploitation into the RL alg efficient detection mechani ormance is similar to that of en the number of malicious of RL-based TRM would higher number of malicious stigations could be carried mprove the performance for icious SUs [30] . The low SUs may not have much mance [31] .
lower average number of tection USION of RL to achieve a more s SUs. Generally speaking, nd respond accordingly in a without having to strictly is intrinsic characteristic of in a hostile environment, ry honest or the honest SUs ses. RL-based TRM shows higher detection rate as TRM. As it has shown to be ng TRM schemes can be L to improve PUs' network E WORK nd analysis show the M model. However, several ed out as follows:
ne PUs and CRNs in the provide a comprehensive ctor , and exploration and gorithm to provide a more ism. Investigation can be done on the RL algorithm to find a trade-off between exploration and exploitation in order to yield higher rewards.
• to perform thorough security measures through testing the RL-based TRM under various attacks scenarios such as sybil attacks [2] and collusion attacks [30, 19] .
• to analyze and determining learning rate to reduce false positive.
• to decrease the probability of malicious SUs in collaboration, hence increasing the overall spectrum utilization, and PUs and SUs quality of service performance.
